Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in the direct mechanisms associated with strategy-proof decision rules. Yet many direct mechanisms also admit Nash equilibria whose outcomes differ from the one under truthtelling. We study a model that has been widely discussed in the mechanism design literature (Sprumont, 1991) and whose strategy-proof and efficient rules typically suffer from the said deficit.
Introduction
In the mechanism design literature, the single-peaked preference domain has played a central role. Most importantly, it paved a way out of the many impossibility results on designing prior-free mechanisms. The celebrated Gibbard and Satterthwaite theorem (see Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) ) showed the impossibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules that would escape the dictatorship predicament. In contrast, within the confine of the single-peaked domain, possibility results emerge. In a pathbreaking paper Moulin (1980) characterizes the class of generalized median voting rules when the feasible set is made of all points on a line. On the private goods front, Sprumont (1991) studies the problem of allocating a divisible and nondisposable good. 1 A remarkable rule emerges in this model: the uniform rule which is uniquely pinned down by efficiency, strategy-proofness and a fairness requirement. The Sprumont model has received a great deal of attention in the mechanism design literature, from alternative characterizations of the uniform rule to explorations of different sets of rules (Barbera et al. (1997) , Moulin (1999) ) and extensions of the model (Adachi (2010) , Bochet et al. (2013) among others). 2
In this paper, we uncover an unexpected property for a rich family of rules. We consider the largest class of rules identified in the literature, the sequential allotment rules (Barbera et al., 1997) characterized by the combination of efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity. Each sequential allotment rule is fully implementable in dominant strategies by its direct revelation mechanism -this can be seen for instance following the results in Mizukami and Wakayama (2007) . However, with the exception of dictatorship-type rules, the class of sequential allotment rules admits a plethora of Nash equilibria whose outcomes differ from the rule under truthtelling in the preference revelation game. We show that the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of the direct revelation mechanism of any such rule is a complete lattice with respect to the order of Pareto dominance. 3 Every complete lattice has a well-defined supremum and infimum. We show that the former is the allocation obtained under truthtelling, hence truthtelling Pareto dominates all other Nash equilibrium outcomes. The infimum of the lattice is, on the other hand, rule-specific. Notice that a salient feature of the model is the change of regime that pertains to variation in demands across different preference profiles -from overdemand to underdemand and vice-versa. For any sequential allotment rule whose initial agents' guaranteed levels are invariant to regime changes, the infimum of the lattice is the allocation formed by the initial guaranteed levels. For the special case of the weighted uniform rules (an extension of the uniform rule to a non-symmetric treatment of agents), the Nash equilibrium allocations are in addition strictly Pareto ranked. 4 Our proof of the lattice structure relies on the three properties characterizing the sequential allotment rules -efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity. Our proof invokes these properties while never making an explicit use of the functional form of sequential allotment rules -we however give a detailed description of the richness of this class of rules in the online appendix.
The rest of the paper is devoted to checking the tightness of our result as well as discussing extension of the model (or the preference domain) where the lattice result may or may not hold. We first investigate the role that replacement monotonicity plays for our result with two examples. We first construct a rule that violates replacement monotonicity and its set of Nash equilibrium allocations is not a lattice with respect to the order of Pareto dominance. This hints that replacement monotonicity is essential for the result -it certainly is in our proof. In addition, the rule considered is efficient and group strategy-proof demonstrating that our result cannot be proved with these two widely used properties. The second example shows that replacement monotonicity is not necessary for the lattice structure to hold. This suggests that replacement monotonicity can be replaced with weaker requirements in our main theorem. While this remains an open question at this stage, we show that non-bossiness is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the lattice structure to hold. Next, we look at possible alternatives of the model or of the preference domain for which the lattice result may hold. On the latter, Masso and Neme (2004) show that there are efficient and strategy-proof rules in the Sprumont model for the set of (partially) single-plateaued preferences. We show that the extended uniform rule characterized on this domain does not retain the lattice structure of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations. Regarding the former, we look at two models. First, we study the multi-commodity extension of the Sprumont model. Adachi (2010) characterizes an extension of the uniform rule under separability of preferences. Using a somewhat strong property that we coin coordinatewise replacement monotonicity, we provide an extension of the lattice result. Finally, we consider the model of Moulin (1980) . We show that for the target rules (Thomson, 1993) -the subclass of the generalized median rules that satisfy replacement monotonicity (in welfare) -the set of Nash equilibrium public good levels is a strictly ordered set. On the other hand, for the well-known median rule the lattice property does not hold.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the necessary definitions. Section 3 presents a detailed account of the sequential allotment rules, as well as some examples on the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of some rules. Section 4 contains all our results. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 5.
Model and Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of agents. There is a fixed amount of a divisible resource Ω > 0 to be allocated. An allotment for i ∈ N is denoted by x i ∈ [0, Ω]. An allocation is a vector of allotments x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [0, Ω] n such that i∈N x i = Ω. Let X be the set of all possible allocations. Each agent i ∈ N has a preference relation R i which is a transitive, complete, and continuous binary relation on [0, Ω]. We use the usual notations P i and I i to denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R i , respectively. We restrict our attention to the set of single-peaked preferences, denoted by R i . That is, there exists a "peak" function p :
, Ω] N be its associated peak profile. For each R ∈ R, i ∈ N and S ⊂ N , we use the following standard notations:
∈S . We also use R S for i∈S R i .
Pareto Comparison and Lattice
For a given preference profile R ∈ R, we define a binary relation R on [0, Ω] n so that for any x, y ∈ [0, Ω] n , x R y if and only if x i R i y i for each i. Clearly, R is reflexive and transitive. Thus, R is a preorder on [0, Ω] n . On the other hand, R is not antisymmetric, i.e., there could be some x, y ∈ [0, Ω] n such that x = y and x R y R x. Antisymmetric preorders are called partial orders. Thus, R is not a partial order on [0, Ω] n . We denote the asymmetric part of R by R which is known as the Pareto dominance. Specifically, x R y if and only if (i) x R y and (ii) there exists i such that x i P i y i .
Fix a subset Y ⊆ [0, Ω] n . We say a pair (Y, R ) is a partially ordered set if R is a partial order on Y . If R is complete and antisymmetric on Y , then (Y, R ) is a totally ordered set.
Let us fix a partially ordered set
for all lower bound y of Z, z R y. We reserve the notation Z for the meet of Z. On the other hand, z ∈ Y is the join of Z if for all upper bound y of Z, y R z. The join of Z is denoted by Z.
It is well known that any complete lattice has both a well-defined supremum and infimum, denoted by x sup and x inf , such that for any
For any two elements x, y ∈ [0, Ω] n , we construct x ∧ y and x ∨ y in [0, Ω] N as follows:
Fix a partially ordered set (Y, R ) and two elements x, y ∈ Y . First observe that it is possible that x ∧ y = y ∧ x. Furthermore, if x ∧ y is in Y , then it is the meet of {x, y}. However, if x ∧ y = y ∧ x then both cannot be members of Y simultaneously: otherwise, R would not be antisymmetric on Y . Analogous comments apply for x ∨ y.
Rules and their properties
A rule is a function f : R → X which maps each preference profile R ∈ R to an allocation f (R) ∈ X. For each R ∈ R and each i ∈ N , f i (R) stands for the resource allocated to agent i at preference profile R.
We now introduce three properties of rules frequently encountered in the literature. The first one is the well-known Pareto efficiency condition.
Pareto efficiency: Rule f satisfies efficiency if there exists no R ∈ R and x ∈ X such that x R f (R).
It is well-known that in the single-peaked preference domain, efficiency of f is equivalent to the following same sidedness condition:
The next requirement deals with the immunity to strategic manipulations that is central in the mechanism design literature. The idea behind this notion is that the planner does not know the agents' preferences. One could simply ask the agents to report their preferences and implement the rule based on their reports. This process is known as the direct revelation mechanism, and if it were to succeed, then the agents need to report their preferences truthfully. Strategy-proofness guarantees that agents will have no incentive to misreport their preferences, thereby establishing the connection between agents' preferences and shares, as expressed by rule f . A rule is said to be manipulable if it violates strategy-proofness.
Strategy-proofness:
Rule f satisfies strategy-proofness if for each R ∈ R, each i ∈ N ,
The last property is replacement monotonicity introduced by Barbera et al. (1997) . It states that the allotment of a "deviator" and the other agents move in opposite directions. If agent i, the "deviator," can walk away with a bigger (resp., smaller) share of the pie, then what is left for the remaining agents has shrunk (resp., increased) compared to the original allocation. Replacement monotonicity then requires that the remaining agents be all affected in the same direction by the change in the resources available to them.
Replacement Monotonicity: Rule f satisfies replacement monotonicity if for each R ∈ R, each i ∈ N , and each
Notice that replacement monotonicity does not impose a-priori that f satisfies any form of symmetry among agents such as anonymity or equal treatment of equals which play a central role in the characterization of the uniform rule. 6, 7 In this paper, we focus on the rules that simultaneously satisfy efficiency, strategyproofness and replacement monotonicity. These are the so-called sequential allotment rules characterized in Barbera et al. (1997) . Before giving a general definition for the family of sequential allotment rules, let us introduce some necessary definitions. First let x L , x H ∈ S be the minimum guaranteed levels of agents in the case of excess supply and excess demand, respectively. Fix a preference profile R ∈ R. Let us define a sequential adjustment function g : X × R → X × R. We use the notation g t to indicate the composition of g with itself t times, with the requirement that g 0 (x, R) = (x, R). Function g is a sequential adjustment function with respect to the minimum guaranteed levels (x L , x H ) if the following items are satisfied for any (
Sequential Allotment Rules: Rule f is a sequential allotment rule if there exists a pair of initial guaranteed levels (x L , x H ) ∈ X × X and a sequential adjustment function g : X × R → X × R relative to x L and x H such that f i (R) = x i , and where, 6 Note also that replacement monotonicity can be derived from other well-known properties. For instance, consistency and resource monotonicity, which play a prominent role in the literature, imply replacement monotonicity.
7 Our definition of replacement monotonicity is the one used in Barbera et al. (1997) . It makes reference to monotonicity in the variation of the allocation itself following a unilateral change in preferences by agent i. It is also possible to define a similar notion that makes reference to monotonicity in the variation of welfare following a unilateral change in preferences by agent i. Thomson (1997) defines this as (one-sided) welfare domination under preference replacement.
It is clear from the definition above that the sequential allotment rules form a very rich class since (i) the initial guaranteed levels can differ across the different regimes, (ii) the guaranteed levels evolve through the iterative allocation procedure implicit in the definition of the sequential allotment rules. For this very reason, our main result will probably come as a surprise: having a common thread across the equilibrium outcomes for such a big family of rules is improbable. A detailed introduction to the richness of the family of sequential allotment rules can be found in the online supplement of this paper. 8 We refer the reader who to the online appendix for more details. While we omit many rules, we provide below the definitions of two specific rules that are discussed extensively in the paper.
Priority Rule: Rule f is a priority rule if there exists a priority ordering on N such that for each R ∈ R and each i,
Weighted uniform rule: Rule f is a weighted uniform rule with respect to the vector
A special case of the weighted uniform rule is when ω H i = ω L i = 1 n , for each i ∈ N . In this case, we obtain the celebrated uniform rule characterized by Sprumont (1991) .
We now discuss some implications of efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity. They imply some additional well-known properties that are used extensively in some of our proofs.
Non-Bossiness: Rule f satisfies non-bossiness if for each R ∈ R, each i ∈ N , and each
Observe that replacement monotonicity implies non-bossiness. Indeed, pick R ∈ R,
, replacement monotonicity and feasibility together imply that f j (R i , R −i ) = f j (R) for all j = i. Hence f (R i , R −i ) = f (R) and non-bossiness holds.
Peak-Onliness: Rule f satisfies peak-onliness if for each R,R ∈ R, p(R i ) = p(R i ) for
Observe that under strategy-proofness, efficiency and non-bossiness (implied by replacement monotonicity), rule f automatically satisfies peak-onliness. Indeed no agent i can affect his part of the allocation by reporting a preference whose peak is unchanged. To see this, pick R ∈ R, i ∈ N and
and hence peak-onliness holds.
Nash Equilibria of direct revelation games
The direct revelation mechanism associated with a given rule f is denoted Γ = (R, f ). In such a mechanism, agents simply report a preference relation to the planner and rule f is used as outcome function. Given a preference profile R ∈ R, (Γ, R) is a direct revelation game. Since all the rules studied in this paper satisfy peak-onliness, one could look at simpler direct revelation mechanisms in which agents report their peaks. For convenience, we however stay with the standard definition. From now on, we refer to f both as a rule and as a direct revelation mechanism. This should cause no confusion.
be the set of Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated to f .
Henceforth, since we fix rule f we will simply write N E(R) in place of N E(f, R). For each R ∈ R, let X N E(R) = {f (R) :R ∈ N E(R)} be the set of Nash equilibrium allocations at profile R. Clearly, this set is a subset of X. We will pair the set of Nash Equilibrium allocations at profile R with a preorder R and study their properties. Our object of study is therefore (X N E(R) , R ). Our main result covers all the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity.
Lattice Structure of Nash Equilibrium Allocations
We first present an example which highlights some of the important features of our analysis. The example also provide some intuition for the general result that will follow.
Example 3.1. A sequential allotment rule: meet and join of Nash equilibrium allocations Let n = 4, Ω = 10 and let rule f be determined as follows. The agents are divided into two groups with the first two agents in group 1 and the last two in group 2. The rule first determines groups' allocations by initially guaranteeing 6 and 4 units to groups 1 and 2 respectively (both for excess demand and supply). Each group then splits its allocation among themselves according to the uniform rule. Let R be such that p(R) = (5, 1, 0, 4). Consider reportsR,R where p(R) = (4, 2, 2, 2) and p(R) = (3, 3, 1, 3). Note thatR,R ∈ N E(R). However, observe that f (R) = (4, 2, 2, 2) is not Pareto comparable to f (R) = (3, 3, 1, 3). At the same time, f (R) ∧ f (R) = (3, 3, 2, 2) and f (R) ∨ f (R) = (4, 2, 1, 3) are not only feasible allocations but they can also be supported as Nash equilibrium allocations. Specifically, a reportR with p(R) = (3, 3, 2, 1) gives f (R) = (3, 3, 2, 2) and is a Nash equilibrium. Finally,Ȓ with p(Ȓ) = (4, 2, 1, 3) gives f (Ȓ) = (4, 2, 1, 3) and is also a Nash equilibrium. In fact, the meet and join of any two Nash equilibrium allocations are also Nash equilibrium allocations, i.e., the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is a lattice, ordered by the Pareto dominance relation R . Importantly, note that if x ∈ X N E(R) then any report profile whose peak is x is itself a Nash equilibrium, i.e. x ∈ N E(R).
Before going to the main findings of our paper, we start with a result that is of independent interest: following the conclusion of Example 3.1, we show that any Nash equilibrium allocation x can be obtained with an alternative Nash equilibrium preference report with peaks at x i for each i ∈ N .
Let us sketch our proof here. SupposeR ∈ N E(R) is a preference profile leading to x, i.e., f (R) = x. If i p(R i ) = Ω then efficiency and peak-onliness give the desired result. Assume without loss of generality that i p(R i ) > Ω. ConsiderR such that p(R) = f (R).
By efficiency (and since
then single-peakedness, strategyproofness and peak onliness give that f i (R) = f (R i ,R −i ). On the other hand, if p(R i ) < f i (R) then i should be able decrease her allocation from f i (R) due to efficiency unless every j = i has a peak at f j (R). Of course, agent i being able to decrease her allocation contradicts that f is strategy-proof. Thus, in both cases we have
. We then show that i has no profitable deviation fromR. Suppose some j = i switches her report fromR j toR j .
. By using the same argument sequentially for each agent j = i, we obtain that f (R i ,R −i ) = f (R). Since f (R) = f (R) and f is strategy-proof, agent i has no profitable deviation fromR. As agent i is selected arbitrarily,R must be a Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to state our main result showing that (i) the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is a complete lattice with respect to the order of Pareto dominance, and (ii) the supremum of the lattice is the allocation under truthtelling. Following this, we will provide some additional results, identifying the infimum of the lattice in some special cases and showing a much stronger result for a subclass of the sequential allotment rules.
Theorem 3.3. Let rule f satisfy efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement mono-
Proof. See Appendix.
Observe that the theorem identifies the allocation under truthtelling as the supremum of the lattice but it is silent on the infimum. The story there is more complicated and depends on specifics of the rule under consideration. Specifically, the initial guaranteed levels x L and x H play an important role in determining the infimum of the lattice of Nash equilibrium allocations. For instance Example 1.2 in the online appendix depicts the structure of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations for the Uniform rule and shows how the equal division allocation is a Nash equilibrium and is always Pareto dominated by all other Nash equilibrium allocations. The characterization in Example 1.2 hinges upon the equality between initial guaranteed levels. When x L = x H , the infimum of the lattice is always the initial guaranteed levels.
Proof. See Appendix
When considering a set of rules for which x L = x H , the infimum of the lattice formed by the set of Nash equilibrium allocations will be specific to each of the rules f considered. Indeed (as discussed in the online appendix) recall that the sequential allotment rules allow to have (i) any initial guaranteed levels, (ii) different guaranteed levels for the excess demand and supply cases, and (iii) at each step of the iteration, guaranteed levels that depend on the size of the resource that is left. 9 Note that (iii) implies that the way the initial guaranteed levels evolve may also be rule specific. For instance, for a given f , x H changes as a function of the remaining resource left after some agents are served. Also x H and x L may actually evolve differently as a function of the resources left once some agents have left the problem. As such, different preference profiles may lead to a different evolution of initial guaranteed levels. In the simpler case where the evolution of initial guaranteed levels is uniform, i.e. the case of the asymmetric weighted uniform rules described in the appendix, the initial guaranteed levels may not even be in the set of Nash equilibrium allocations for some preference profiles as the following example shows.
Example 3.5. Different initial guaranteed levels Let n = 3, Ω = 6, and R ∈ R be such that p(R) = (1, 2, 4). Let x H = (3, 1.5, 1.5), x L = (2.9, 1.6, 1.5) and let f be the weighted uniform rule associated with x L and x H .
, then agent 1 would strictly benefit by deviating toR 1 . If not, then observe thatR 1 must be such that
As a result f (R 1 ,R −1 ) = (2.9, 1.6, 1.5) = x L . Agent 1 strictly benefits from such a deviation, a contradiction withR ∈ N E(R).
< Ω, then agent 3 would strictly benefit by deviating toR 3 . If not, then observe thatR 3 must be such
. Agent 3 strictly benefits from such a deviation, a contradiction with R ∈ N E(R).
The above example shows that whenever x L = x H , the initial guaranteed levels may no longer be in the set of Nash equilibrium allocations for some preference profile R. 10 A full characterization of the lower bound of the lattice seems therefore out of reach.
We conclude our series of results with the special case of the weighted uniform rules: the lattice formed by the Nash equilibrium allocations is in fact ranked, i.e. there are no Nash equilibrium allocations that end up not being Pareto comparable.
Proposition 3.6. Let f be a weighted uniform rule. Then (X N E(R) , R ) is a totally ordered set, i.e. the Nash equilibrium allocations are all Pareto comparable.
We now make a couple of observations. One may wonder if the set of Nash equilibria itself is a complete lattice, or if the set of Nash equilibrium allocations satisfies convexity. The answers to these questions turn out to be both negative as shown in the following two examples.
Example 3.7. The set of Nash equilibria is not a lattice Let n = 3, Ω = 6 and f be the uniform rule. Pick R ∈ R such that p(R) = (2, 2, 2). Consider in addition two additional profilesR,R ∈ R with p(R) = (2, 2, 3) and p(R) = (1, 2, 2). Observe that f (R) = f (R) = (2, 2, 2). Thus,R,R ∈ N E(R). However, f (R 1 ,R −1 ) = (1, 2, 3). Clearly, both agents 1 and 3 have some profitable unilateral
Example 3.8. Non-convexity of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations
Let n = 4, Ω = 8 and f be the uniform rule. Pick R ∈ R such that p(R) = (0, 1, 3, 4).
Regardless of the choice of the sequential allotment rule f , we know that f (R) = (0, 1, 3, 4) and R ∈ N E(R). LetR ∈ R be such that p(R) = (2, 2, 2, 2). Then f (R) = (2, 2, 2, 2) andR ∈ N E(R). However, the linear combination of these two allocations with equal weights is not a Nash equilibrium allocation. Indeed, allocation (1, 1.5, 2.5, 3) occurs only if the agents reportR with p(R) = (1, 1.5, 2.5, 3). However, by reverting to truthtelling agent 3 would get 2.75 which is strictly preferred to getting 2.5.
Discussion: Robustness Checks and Extensions

On the role of replacement monotonicity
We discuss the role that replacement monotonicity plays in Theorems 5.7 and 3.3. 11 We investigate this issue by means of two examples.
The first example demonstrates that one cannot prove Theorem 5.7 without assuming replacement monotonicity (or some weaker version of it). Using another example, we then show that replacement monotonicity is however not necessary for the result of Theorem 5.7 to hold.
Example 4.1. Replacement monotonicity is key Let n = 3 and Ω = 6. Let f be described as follows. For any profile R ∈ R, If p(R 1 ), p(R 2 ) < Ω n then f is a priority rule with respect to ordering 1 2 3. However, if at least one of the first two agents has preferences with peak at 2 or above, then f is the uniform rule. Rule f is efficient and non-bossy: Rule f is either a priority rule or the uniform rule depending on the first two agents' peaks. Both rules are efficient implying that so is f .
Since Ω = 6, observe that whenever both agents 1 and 2 report their peaks strictly below 2, each obtains her reported peak. However, whenever one (or both) of them reports a peak at 2 or above, she obtains at least 2 units of resource. Thus, no agent can force f to switch from or to the priority rule without changing her own allocation. In addition, both the priority rule and the uniform rule satisfy non-bossiness, thus f also satisfies non-bossiness.
Rule f is strategy-proof: For agent 3 this is obvious because his reported preferences alone cannot force f to switch to or from a priority rule (and the uniform rule). Given that both rules are strategy-proof, truthtelling is a dominant strategy for agent 3. Fix any R ∈ R and consider agent 1. Case 1: Suppose p(R 2 ) ≥ 2. Then f is the uniform rule regardless of 1's report. Given that the uniform rule is strategy-proof, truthtelling is a dominant strategy. Case 2: Suppose p(R 2 ) < 2. If p(R 1 ) < 2 then agent 1 has no incentive to misreport her preferences because f 1 (R) = p(R 1 ). If p(R 1 ) ≥ 2, the f (R) is the uniform rule. For any of her reportR 1 with p(R 1 ) ≥ 2, f (R 1 , R −1 ) is also the uniform rule which is strategyproof. Thus, anyR 1 with p(R 1 ) ≥ 2 is not a profitable deviation. Finally, considerR 1 with p(R 1 ) < 2. Now f is a priority rule. Thus, f 1 (R 1 , R −1 ) = p(R 1 ) < 2 ≤ p(R 1 ). By reporting her peak truthfully, agent 1 is allocated at least 2 but never more than p(R 1 ). Thus, agent 1 has no incentive to lie. Similar arguments prove that none of the other two agents has an incentive to misrepresent her preferences.
Rule f does not satisfy replacement monotonicity: Consider a profile R ∈ R such that p(R) = (1, 2, 2). Because p(R 2 ) ≥ 2, f allocates according to the uniform rule. Thus, f (R) = (2, 2, 2). However, if agent 2 deviates toR 2 with p(R 2 ) = 1 then f (R 2 , R −2 ) = (1, 1, 4) since f then follows the priority rule. Clearly, the allocations of agents 1 and 3 move in different directions following the change in the report of agent 2.
Truthtelling does not Pareto dominate all the Nash equilibrium allocations:
Consider a profile R ∈ R such that p(R) = (1, 1, 2). In this case, f (R) = (1, 1, 4). ConsiderR ∈ R such that p(R) = (2, 2, 2). It is easy to see that f (R) = (2, 2, 2) and R ∈ N E(R). Clearly, the allocation under truthtelling does not Pareto dominate the one underR.
The set of Nash equilibrium allocations is not a lattice ordered by the Pareto relation: For this, notice that f (R) ∨ f (R) = (1, 1, 2) and f (R) ∧ f (R) = (2, 2, 4) are not even feasible allocations, so replacement monotonicity seems essential to guarantee the feasibility of the meet and join of Nash equilibrium allocations.
Remark 4.2. There are two important conclusions coming from Example 4.1. The first one is that replacement monotonicity cannot be replaced by non-bossiness. Next, Bochet and Tumennasan (2018) show that under efficiency, the combination of non-bossiness and strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness. 12,13 Thus, the rule described in Example 4.1 is group strategy-proof -one can easily prove this directly. An important conclusion follows: efficiency and group strategy-proofness together do not necessarily lead to the lattice structure of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations.
Based on the example above, one may wonder if replacement monotonicity is necessary for the lattice structure of Nash equilibrium allocations to hold for efficient, strategy-proof rules. Our second example shows that the answer to this question is negative.
Example 4.3. A mixture of group strategy-proof priority and uniform rule that violates replacement monotonicity but preserve the lattice structure Consider the following rule f . For any R ∈ R, agent 1 always gets his peak p(R 1 ). If p(R 1 ) ≤ 2 then the remaining agents split Ω − p(R 1 ) according to the uniform rule. If p(R 1 ) > 2, then the remaining agents split Ω − p(R 1 ) using the fixed priority ordering over the set of agents N \ 1. It is clear that f does not satisfy replacement monotonicity since increases in the peak of agent 1 may generate a non-monotonic change in the allocation of agents other than agent 1. It is also obvious that f satisfies group strategyproofness. Finally, given what we already know about the uniform rule, it is clear that the set of Nash equilibrium is a lattice and truthtelling Pareto dominates all other Nash equilibrium allocations.
The example above shows that replacement monotonicity is not necessary for the lattice structure of Nash equilibrium allocations associated with efficient, strategy-proof rules. Ideally, one would want to pin down a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for the lattice structure to hold. This unfortunately remains an open question at this stage. We however demonstrate below that non-bossiness is a necessary condition for the lattice structure to hold. In conclusion, a necessary and sufficient condition for the lattice structure lies between replacement monotonicity and non-bossiness. Recall that the rule in Example 4.3 satisfies non-bossiness yet the set of Nash equilibrium allocations yet the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is not a lattice. Thus, if replacement monotonicity is to be replaced with another condition in Theorem 3.3 then it condition should be more demanding than non-bossiness. Proof. See Appendix.
to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in welfare (Theorem 3.8). In our setting, under the requirement of efficiency group-resilience is equivalent to group strategy-proofness (Corollary 4.5). Furthermore, nonbossiness and strategy-proofness implies non-bossiness in welfare (Lemma 4.7). By combining these three results, one obtains the result in the text. Some of these properties are not defined in this paper but we refer interested readers to Bochet and Tumennasan (2018) .
Alternative Characterizations of Theorem 3.3
In this subsection, we discuss if some of the requirements of Theorem 3.3 can be replaced with other well-known properties. As we already pointed out in Section 2, it is well-known that efficiency is equivalent to the same-sidedness condition in the Sprumont model. Hence, we obtain the following corollary which is more useful when we investigate the multi-commodity setting.
Corollary 4.5. Let f satisfy same-sidedness, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity. For each R ∈ R, (X N E(R) , R ) is a complete lattice whose supremum element is f (R).
We now discuss some variants of replacement monotonicity. Indeed, replacement monotonicity can be written in different ways, depending whether one is interested in a property which makes reference to variations in physical terms or in welfare (see Thomson (2016) for a detailed discussion). On the latter, one possible variant is the following. 14
Replacement Monotonicity in
It turns out that replacement monotonicity in welfare is very demanding -see Thomson (1997) for a detailed discussion of the implication of replacement monotonicity in welfare and its one-sided variant in the Sprumont model. 15 For instance, the uniform rule does not satisfy this property.
Example 4.6. Violation of replacement monotonicity in welfare Let n = 3 and Ω = 12. Let f be the uniform rule. Consider R with p(R) = (0, 0, 8) andR 1 with p(R 1 ) = 8. Then f (R) = (2, 2, 8) and f (R 1 , R −1 ) = (6, 0, 6). Clearly, f (R) P 3 f (R 1 , R −1 ) but f (R 1 , R −1 ) P 2 f (R). Thus, the uniform rule does not satisfy replacement monotonicity in welfare.
In the example above, there is an underdemand under profile R but an overdemand under profile (R 1 , R −1 ). Because of this regime change, replacement monotonicity in welfare is not satisfied. However, observe that locally the uniform rule satisfies replacement monotonicity in welfare. 
Under efficiency, local replacement monotonicity in welfare turns out to be equivalent to replacement monotonicity.
Theorem 4.7. Let f satisfy efficiency, strategy-proofness and local replacement monotonicity in welfare. For each R ∈ R, (X N E(R) , R ) is a complete lattice whose supremum element is f (R).
Multiple Resources
We look at an extension of the Sprumont model to the case where there are m different resources and agents have multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences, as defined in Adachi (2010) . Accordingly, we adjust the notions introduced in Section 2. Specifically, the stock of resources Ω and each agent i's allotment x i are m-dimensional vectors. We use superscript to signify resource . As before, an allocation x is a collection of allotments x = (x i ) i∈N such that i∈N x i = Ω for all = 1, · · · , m. We also maintain the assumption that the preferences are single peaked. That is, for each R i , there exists a peak function p : R i → [0, Ω 1 ] × · · · × [0, Ω m ] such that whenever a pair of allocations x = y satisfies for each all = 1, · · · , m, either y i ≤ x i < p (R i ) or p (R i ) ≤ x i ≤ y i , then x i P i y i . A rule f maps single-peaked preference profiles to allocations. Once we make the above mentioned adjustments, the remaining definitions such as efficiency, strategyproofness, Nash equilibria of the preference revelation game and the lattice structure remain the same.
The combination of efficiency and strategy-proofness is known to be very demanding in multi-resource environments. Thus, we will weaken the definition of efficiency to (an extension) of the same-sidedness condition introduced in Section 2. 17 Same-Sidedness: Rule f satisfies same sidedness if i p (R i ) ≤ Ω for each = 1, ..., m
We next define replacement monotonicity in the multi-resource setting by imposing replacement monotonicity in each resource.
Coordinatewise Replacement monotonicity: Rule f satisfies coordinatewise replacement monotonicity if for any , i ∈ N , R andR i ,
17 When m = 1, the definition is identical to the one given in Section 2.
Notice that we can easily extend the local version of replacement monotonicity in welfare to the multi-resource setting. However, such a requirement turns out to be too demanding as shown below using the example of a rule that is efficient and strategy-proof. = (7, 7) . Here, f is a priority rule with respect to the ordering 1 2 3. Suppose p(R 1 ) = (3, 3), p(R 2 ) = (4, 2) and p(R 3 ) = (0, 3). Then the allocation is f 1 (R) = (3, 3), f 2 (R) = (4, 2) and f 3 (R) = (0, 2). Suppose that agent 1's preferences change slightly toR 1 so that p 1 (R 1 ) = 3 + and p 2 (R 1 ) = 3 − where is an arbitrarily small, positive number. Then f 1 (R 1 , R −1 ) = (3 + , 3 − ), f 2 (R 1 , R −1 ) = (4 − , 2) and f 3 (R 1 , R −1 ) = (0, 2 + ). Clearly, agent 2 is worse off while agent 3 is better off. Hence, the priority rules do not satisfy local replacement monotonicity in welfare.
Coordinatewise replacement monotonicity is admittedly a strong requirement but replacement monotonicity in terms of welfare is just too demanding as the example above demonstrates: not even priority rules satisfy it. We next introduce a property that requires that the allocation of each resource only depends on the reported peaks of that resource.
Separability Peak-onliness, separability and single-peakedness allow us to treat the preference revelation game in m-resource setting as if the agents play a separate game for each resource where they reveal their peaks of that resource. Thus, the class of rules satisfying same-sidedness, strategy-proofness and coordinatewise resource monotonicity are coordinatewise sequential allotment rules. Another immediate consequence is the following result. Given that efficiency is more demanding than the same-sidedness condition, we obtain the following corollary. 
Larger Preference Domains
One may wonder if the lattice structure of the Nash equilibrium allocations is extended to larger preference domains. On the latter, Masso and Neme (2004) show that there remain efficient and strategy-proof rules in the Sprumont model for the set of (partially) single-plateaued preferences. We show that the extended uniform rule characterized on this domain by Masso and Neme (2004) does not retain the lattice structure of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations. Hence, even in a slight enlargement of the single-peaked preference domain to the one of single plateaued preferences, the lattice result is lost.
In order to make the discussion complete, let us define the single-plateaued domain.
Agent i is indifferent between the allotments in p(R i ). On the other hand, if x i < p(R i ) and
We show that the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of the extended uniform rule is not a lattice.
Example 4.12. The lattice property does not extend to a larger preference domain Suppose that n = 2 and Ω = 10. Let R ∈ R be such that p(R 1 ) = [3, 4] and p(R 2 ) = [6, 7] . Let f be the extended uniform rule. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations is given by X N E(R) = {x ∈ X : 3 ≤ x 1 ≤ 5}. Observe that (X N E(R) , R ) is not a lattice. In fact, it is not even a partially ordered set because R is not antisymmetric on X N E(R) . For instance, (3, 7) R (4, 6) R (3, 7) . However, we note that truthtelling which results in the allocation (3.5, 6.5) is not Pareto dominated by any other Nash equilibrium allocation.
Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
Aside from the private good economy we are studying in this paper, the single-peaked preferences domain has been salient for many other applications. Notably, the wide interest for strategy-proof rules when preferences are single-peaked primarily started with Moulin (1980) 's seminal contribution. Moulin (1980) characterizes the class of generalized median voting rules on the basis of efficiency and strategy-proofness -see also Barbera and Jackson (1994) . There, a single point on the real line must be chosen as a function of the preferences of agents. The class of generalized median voting rules forms the class of all the (efficient) strategy-proof rules in this model. Thomson (1993) shows that the only subclass that satisfies replacement monotonicity (in welfare) is the so-called class of Target Rules which we define below. For this let [0, Ω] be the set of possible public good levels. Preferences remain single-peaked on this interval. For any profile R ∈ R,
Target Rules: Rule f a is a target rule with respect to a ∈ [0, Ω] if for each R ∈ R,
In the family of target rules, each rule is indexed by a level a ∈ [0, Ω] and so the family is obviously large. We characterize below the structure of the set of Nash equilibrium public good levels for a given target rule. Fix a ∈ [0, Ω] and consider rule f a .
Case 1: For R ∈ R, if f a (R) = a, then a is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
Indeed, notice that for a not be selected it must be that agents reportR such that either max p(R) < a or minp(R) > a. But thenR cannot be a Nash equilibrium outcome since any agent can enforce a to be the level of public good selected. 18 Therefore the set of Nash equilibrium public good levels is either a singleton (the target a), or it is an interval. For the latter is it either the interval [f (R), a] or [a, f (R)] depending on the position of f (R) with respect to the target a. Observe that these Nash equilibrium levels are strictly Pareto ranked. In Case 1, the set of Nash equilibrium is a singleton. In Case 2, suppose f a (R) > a, then the set of Nash equilibrium allocations [a, f a (R)] is a complete lattice with infimum a and supremum f a (R). Any x, x ∈ [a, f (R)] are strictly Pareto ranked. We therefore have the following immediate result.
Theorem 4.13. Consider the public good model of Moulin (1980) . Let f be a rule that satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity in welfare. Then (X N E(R) , R ) is a complete lattice. In fact, X N E(R) is a strictly ordered set.
The set of generalized median voting rules contain many rules that violate replacement monotonicity in welfare. An example of such a rule is the median rule itself. One may wonder whether such rules may retain the lattice structure of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations. The answer turns out to be negative as shown in the following example.
Example 4.14. Replacement monotonicity in welfare is essential for the lattice structure to hold Let n = 3 and f be the median rule. Consider the profile R with p(R 1 ) < p(R 2 ) < p(R 3 ). 19 By definition of the median, f (R) = p(R 2 ). By construction of the singlepeaked preferences, there exists x < p(R 1 ) such that x I 1 p(R 2 ). Consider the reportR with p(R i ) = p(R j ) for each i, j ∈ N , and such that x < min p(R) = max p(R) < p(R 2 ). Then f (R) = p(R i ). Notice thatR is a Nash equilibrium as no unilateral deviation can alter the median. Notice also that f (R) P j f (R) for j = 2, 3 while f (R) P 1 f (R). Hence the truthtelling public good level f (R) and f (R) are two Nash equilibrium levels that are not Pareto comparable, and their meet and join are then obviously not well-defined. We conclude that the set of Nash equilibrium levels is not a complete lattice. Moreover the truthtelling public good level does not Pareto dominate all the other Nash equilibrium level.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have established not only some surprising properties of truthtelling in the Sprumont model, but also an unexpected feature of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of all the rules characterized in Barbera et al. (1997) . Following our main result, the discussion we offer clarifies that replacement monotonicity, although at the heart of our characterization, does not seem to be necessary for the lattice structure to hold. Instead a condition which lies "between" replacement monotonicity and non-bossiness is probably both necessary and sufficient. We could only establish that non-bossiness is a necessary condition, and we leave open for future research the identification of such a condition which may be key to obtain a generalization of our results. Nevertheless, we do offer a glimpse at some extensions of our results provided the preference domain is confined to agents having single-peaked preferences over the set of individual outcomes -Example 4.12 makes clear that an enlargement of the domain does not seem possible.
Yet an important remaining question is whether there are other models where the lattice structure holds. Our study of the single-plateaued domain seem to indicate that such models are rare. We are however aware that the Nash outcomes for the Boston mechanism in the school choice literature form a complete lattice (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006) . One significant difference from our result is that the allocation under truthtelling 19 Formally, the median rule is defined as the rule which, for each R ∈ R, selects the median of the peaks and (n − 1) phantoms that are positioned at (i) (n−1) 2 at 0 and the same at Ω if n is odd, (ii) (n−2) 2 at 0 and the same at Ω, while the remaining phantom is arbitrarily fixed at either 0 or Ω depending on the way ties are to be broken.
is not the supremum of the lattice. Ergin and Sönmez (2006) show that the set of Nash outcomes is equivalent to one of stable matchings which are well-known to form a complete lattice (see for instance Knuth (1976) , Adachi (2000) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) ). 20 It is not clear if there is any common thread in the two models that lead to the lattice result. We leave this question open for future research.
Another open question is if our result can be proved by using Tarski's fixed theorem. After all Nash equilibria are fixed points, and Tarski's fixed point theorem concerns the lattice structure of fixed points. In this sense, we wonder if our result is an application of this celebrated theorem.
Finally, while we did not discuss this in the introduction, our approach in this paper fits also with the small literature investigating some of the additional strategic features of rules in models with single-peaked preferences. For instance, Bochet and Sakai (2010) show that the Nash equilibrium allocations of the uniform rule are Pareto dominated by the outcome obtained from truthful revelation. Also, Bochet et al. (2019) show that for a large family of manipulable rules (e.g. the proportional rule) the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is a singleton corresponding to the truthtelling allocation of the uniform rule.
Appendix
Auxiliary Lemmas
In order to prove our main result, we first need to introduce several auxiliary lemmas which will be used as facts or sometimes building blocks of some portion of the main proof. Some of these lemmas have appeared elsewhere in the literature while some are new. For all the lemmas, we assume that rule f satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement monotonicity.
Proof. We prove the first part only. Fix anyR i = R i . By strategy-proofness, we have
In the next lemma, we identify how a change in an agent's report affects one's own allocation. Specifically, if agent i was allocated less than his peak, then any report with a peak above his allocation does not alter the allocation. If the original and new reports 20 Knuth attributes the result on the lattice structure of stable matchings to John Conway. have peaks respectively on the left and right of the original allocation then the new allocation can increase but never exceeds the new peak.
Lemma 5.2. For any R ∈ R, i ∈ N andR i ∈ R i with p(R i ) < p(R i ), one of the following cases must occur:
Proof. The lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.1.
The next lemma covers the situation in which a group changes its report so that each member's new peak moves in the same direction. If no agent's unilateral change alters the allocation then the group's report should also not lead to any changes. We know that the induction assumption is true if k = 1. We now show that for allT ⊆ S with |T | = k + 1 it must be that f (RT , R −T ) = f (R). In contrast, suppose that there existsT with |T | = k + 1 such that f (RT , R −T ) = f (R). We first show that f i (R) < f i (RT , R −T ) for each i ∈ S. Pick any i ∈T , and set T =T \ {i}.
Because |T | = k, by the induction assumption,
, we obtain that f i (R) < f i (RT , R −T ) and f j (RT , R −T ) ≤ f j (R) for all j = i. However, we picked agent i from S arbitrarily, which means that f j (R) < f j (R S ,R −S ) for all j ∈ S. The last two relations are not compatible.
The next two lemmas are concerned with Nash equilibrium reports. Suppose that one can decrease (or increase) her own Nash equilibrium allocation through a unilateral deviation. Then one's peak must have exceeded (respectively fallen short of) the original allocation.
This contradicts Lemma 5.1.
The next lemma states that if the peaks of one's true and new reported preferences are on the same side of the Nash equilibrium allocation then the allocation should not change. This is also true for groups.
Lemma 5.5. Pick R,R ∈ R such thatR ∈ N E(R), and pick anyR ∈ R. For any 
. Given that this is true for all i ∈ S, by Lemma 5.3, we have that f (R S ,R −S ) = f (R). By adopting the above arguments slightly, we find that
Finally, the following lemma shows how a deviating group's and remaining agents' allocations change. Suppose a group changes its preferences so that each member's new reported preference peak exceeds one's own original allocation. Then no member gets more than one's new peak. In addition, those who are not in the group must get less than their original allocation.
Proof. Pick R,R ∈ R. We here provide a proof for f (R S , R −S ). Fix any i ∈ S. By Lemma 5.2,
. Now sequentially changing the preferences of each agent j ∈ S \ {i} from R j toR j , we complete the proof for f (R S , R −S ).
Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Pick R ∈ R and x ∈ X N E(R) . LetR ∈ R be such that R ∈ N E(R) and f (R) = x. If i∈N p(R i ) = Ω then we are done because f is peakonly and efficient. Suppose that i∈N p(R i ) = Ω. Without loss of generality, let us assume that Ω < i∈N p(R i ). By efficiency, f i (R) ≤ p(R i ) for each i ∈ N . In fact, this inequality must be strict for at least one agent because
. We now show that (R S ,R −S ) ∈ N E(R). Suppose otherwise. By combining this with the fact that f satisfies strategy-proofness, there must exist an agent
(1)
Consider now (R i * ,R −i ). Because f i * (R) < p(R i * ), by Lemma 5.2 it must be that (1). Thus, (R S ,R −S ) ∈ N E(R). Finally, the peak-onliness of f implies the claim of this step.
then the allocations of agents i * and j fall on different sides of their respective peaks at (R i * ,R −i * ), a contradiction with efficiency. Hence, for each j = i * , we have p(R j ) = f j (R). Recall that i∈N f i (R) = Ω < i∈N p(R i ). This condition is satisfied only if f i * (R) < p(R i * ) which means that S = {i * }. Consequently, there exists only one agent i * with p(R i * ) < f i * (R) and S = {i * }. Let nowR i * ∈ R be such that (R i * ,R −i * ) = (R S ,R −S ) and p(R i * ) = f i * (R). We are left to show that (R S ,R −S ) ∈ N E(R). We already know that i * has no unilateral and profitable deviation. By following the same steps used in the proof of Case (a), one can show that no other agent has a profitable deviation. Finally, the peak-onliness of f completes the proof.
Theorem 5.7. Let rule f satisfy efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement mono-
Proof. Let R ∈ R be the preference profile. We fix two distinct allocationsx,x ∈ X N E(R) . By Lemma 3.2, there existR,R ∈ N E(R) such that f (R) = p(R) =x and f (R) = p(R) = x. Next, let us partition N in into three sets W , E and O so that W ≡ {i ∈ N :
We further decompose W toW andW so that
In addition, let d i = |f i (R) − f i (R)|. We note here that i∈W d i = i∈E d i .
We will proceed in several steps.
Step 1. Peak Relations for Partitions of Agents
The setW = ∅ if and only ifẼ = ∅. Similarly, the setW = ∅ if and only ifĒ = ∅. In addition, 
by strategy-proofness. We also cannot have
Thus, i ∈Ẽ and given that i is selected arbitrarily from T , we find that T ⊆Ẽ = ∅.
Let us now go back and consider (R W ∪S ,R −W ∪S ) andR which differ in the preferences of those in T . Between these profiles, the allocations of only those in T increase. Furthermore, the allocation of each agent i ∈ T increases by at most d i (see (8)). On the other hand, the allocation of those inW must decrease by at least i∈W d i (see (11)). Thus, we find that
Given that T ⊆Ẽ, we have
The same logic used to find the above inequality also yields that
Thus, we obtain (3). Because T ⊆Ẽ ⊆ E, the above equation implies that T =Ẽ. Then because (12) must be satisfied for all i ∈ T =Ẽ we obtain (5). The rest of the step can be proved similarly.
Step 2. Allocations for Various Configurations ofR andR
We must have that
Proof of Step 2. Recall Fact 1 in
Step 1 and thatẼ = T . Thus, between profiles (R −Ẽ ,RẼ) andR, the allocations of only those inẼ increase collectively by i∈Ẽ (p(R i )− f i (R −Ẽ ,RẼ)) ≤ i∈Ẽ d i . At the same time, the allocations of those inW must decrease collectively by i∈W (f i (R −Ẽ ,RẼ) − p(R i )) ≥ i∈W d i in order to have f i (R) = p(R i ) for each agent i. Because i∈Ẽ d i = i∈W d i , we find that
In addition, because the increase in the allocations of those inẼ cancels the decrease in the allocations of those inW , we must have that
Then by Lemma 5.2 and non-bossiness, for each i ∈W ,
Then by Lemma 5.3, we have that
.
Given that f (R W ,R −W ) = f (R −Ẽ ,RẼ)) we complete the proof for the first two equalities in the equation given in Step 2. The last two equalities are proved similarly.
Step 3. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations is a partially ordered set.
(X N E(R) , R ) is a partially ordered set. Proof of Step 3. One needs to show that R is antisymmetric on X N E(R) . Becausẽ
x =x are chosen arbitrarily, we only need to show that there exists at least one agent who is not indifferent betweenx = f (R) andx = f (R). This immediately follows from
Step 1 and the single-peakedness of preferences.
We are now ready to prove that the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is a lattice. To prove this, we only need to show thatx ∧x = f (R) ∧ f (R) ∈ X N E(R) andx ∨x = f (R) ∨ f (R) ∈ X N E(R) . This is obvious if f (R) and f (R) are Pareto comparable. Thus, we complete the proof once we prove the following statement.
Step 4. Concluding: meets and joins of non-comparable Nash equilibrium allocations Because (R i ,R −i ) is a report for which there is overdemand,
By combining the above equations, we find that
The last equality comes from feasibility. However, we already know that f i (R) = p(R i ) < f i (R i ,R −i ) and f j (R i ,R −i ) ≤ f j (R) = p(R j ) for all j ∈Ẽ \ i. By combining this with the results above, we prove the claim. Observe here that there must exist at least one agent i * ∈Ẽ \ i for whom f i * (R i ,R −i ) < f i * (R) = p(R i * ). Consider now (R i ,R −i ) and (R i ,RW ,R −(W ∪i) ) which differ in the preferences of those inĒ. For each j ∈Ē, f j (R i ,R −i ) = p(R j ) < p(R j ). From Lemma 5.6, f j (R i ,R −i ) ≤ f j (RW ,R −W ) ≤ p(R j ) for all j ∈Ē, and f j (RW ,R −W ) ≤ f j (R i ,R −i ) for all j / ∈Ē. From step 2, f (RW ,R −W ) = f (R). The cases in which f i (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ) < f i (RW ,R −W ) = p(R i ) < p(R i ) are incompatible with strategy-proofness. Suppose f i (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ) = f i (RW ,R −W ) = p(R i ). Then by non-bossiness, f (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ) = f (RW ,R −W ). This means that f i * (R i ,R −i ) < p(R i * ) = f i * (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ) = f (RW ,R −W ) which cannot occur as pointed out earlier. Finally suppose that f i (RW ,R −W ) < f i (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ). In this case, consider (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ) and (R i ,R −i ) which differ in the preferences of those inW . Because p(R j ) < p(R j ) for each j ∈W and i / ∈W , by Lemma 5.2 and replacement monotonicity, we have that f i (R) = p(R i ) < f i (R i ,RW ,R −W ∪i ) ≤ f i (R i ,R −i ). Then by Lemma 5.4, we must have p(R i ) ≤ f i (R) which contradicts f i (R) = f i (R) < p(R i ).
We will reach a similar contradiction if i ∈Ē. This completes the proof that (RW ∪Ẽ ,RW ∪Ē ,R O ) ∈ N E(R).
Let nowR ∈ R be such thatR = (RW ∪Ẽ ,RW ∪Ē ,R O ). Similarly to the previous case,
we have that f i (R) = p(R i ) for all i ∈ N and
In addition, by non-bossiness, f (R t ) = f (R i , R t −i ). Consequently,
Let t ≡ max j =i |p(R j ) − p(R t j )|. Let us now reach (R i ,R −i ) from (R i , R t −i ) by sequentially changing the agents' preferences. At any step of this process, by Lemma 5.2, the allocation of the agent whose preference is modified changes at most by t . Hence, by replacement monotonicity, i's allocation changes at most by t at any step or by (n − 1) t as a result of this whole process. However, t → t→∞ 0. Hence,
This contradicts (13).
We are now ready to conclude.
Step 3. For each R ∈ R, (X N E (R), R ) is a complete lattice. Proof of Step 3. Fix any Y ⊆ X N E(R) . We need to show that both the meet and join of Y exists on X N E(R) . We only show this for the meet. Denote the closure of Y by cl(Y ). By Step 2, cl(Y ) ⊆ X N E(R) . In addition, because X is bounded so is X N E(R) . Consequently, cl(Y ) is compact. Because R i is continuous for each i ∈ N , there must exist y i ∈ cl(Y ) such that xR i y i for any x ∈ cl(Y ). Since N is finite, i y i ∈ X N E(R) . Clearly, i y i = cl(Y ). We are now left to show that i y i is the meet of Y on X N E(R) . This is obvious if y i ∈ Y for all i. Suppose this is not the case. Because Y ⊂ cl(Y ), i y i is a lower bound of Y on X N E(R) . Thus, if i y i is not the meet of Y then there exists another lower bound of Y in X N E(R) , say y, that Pareto dominates i y i . Fix an agent j for whom yP j i y i I j y j . By construction, if y j ∈ Y then yP j y j . Thus, y is not a lower bound. As a result, y j / ∈ Y . However, because y j ∈ cl(Y ) there exists an allocation x ∈ Y which is arbitrarily close y j . By continuity of R j , yP j x. This contradicts that y is a lower bound of Y on X N E(R) . Hence, i y i = Y We now prove that when the initial guaranteed levels are invariant to regime changes, the infimum of the lattice is the equal division allocation.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Let R,R ∈ R be such that p(R i ) = x * i for each i ∈ N . We first show thatR ∈ N E(R). Clearly, f (R) = x * . Under any sequential allotment rule, every agent i ∈ N who reportsR i will get allocated exactly x * i regardless of the others' reports. Thus, if some agent i * reports some otherR i * then f i * (R i * ,R −i * ) = x * i . Thus, R ∈ N E(R).
Consider anyR ∈ N E(R). We now show that as long as f (R) = f (R), f (R) Pareto dominates f (R). We already mentioned that any agent i ∈ N can obtain the initial guar-
